



## The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Turkey-EU Relations: Responses in Politics

Şeyma AKIN<sup>1</sup>, H. Bahadır AKIN<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu, Konya - [akinseyma@gmail.com](mailto:akinseyma@gmail.com)

<sup>2</sup> Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Turizm Fakültesi, Konya - [bahadirakin@gmail.com](mailto:bahadirakin@gmail.com)

### Abstract

The mass migration from Syria not overstressed the capacity of neighbouring countries in every aspect; it also led to the revision of policies and international cooperation. It is assumed that more than 3 million Syrians sought shelter in various parts of Turkey today; thus, not only affecting the policy makers in Turkey but also citizens in their daily lives. This paper aims to track the EU-Turkey relations in connection with the refugee crisis and analyse the responses to the refugee crisis both in Turkey as a country directly affected by the mass migration and the EU as a region confronted with the situation and looking for solutions through cooperation with Turkey. In this context, the paper is descriptive and looks into the present situation in Turkey and the EU and then focuses on the legal, social and political changes and responses; finally it presents the discussions which are likely to shape the solution to the refugee crisis.

**Keywords:** Turkey, EU-relations, Syrian refugees, migration, Turkish Politics.

## Suriye Mülteci Krizleri ve Türkiye-AB İlişkileri: Siyasetteki Cevaplar

### Özet

Suriye'den kitlesel göç komşu ülkelerin kapasitelerini her açıdan zorlamakla kalmamış, politika değişiklikleri ve uluslararası iş birliğini de gerektirmiştir. Türkiye genelinde değişik yerlerde 3 milyonun üzerinde Suriyelinin barınmaya çalıştığı düşünüldüğünde bu durumun sadece politikacıları değil günlük hayatlarında yurttaşları da etkilediği kabul edilmelidir. Bu çalışmada problemden doğrudan etkilenen ülke olarak Türkiye ile durumla yüzleşerek Türkiye ile iş birliği çözümleri arayan Avrupa Birliğinin mülteci krizine tepkileri analiz edilmektedir. Bu kapsamda Türkiye AB ilişkilerinin mevcut durumu ele alındıktan sonra yasal, sosyal ve politik değişimler ile tepkilere bakılmakta, nihayet mülteci krizinin çözümünün nasıl şekilleneceği tartışılmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Türkiye, AB İlişkileri, Suriyeli Mülteciler, Göç, Türk Siyaseti

### 1. Introduction: Migration as a modern problem

The 20th century went through many changes, one of which was mass migration. Caused by the two world wars, the world experienced tremendous changes in the structure of population; however, the immense population movements went on after the wars. A conflict within a country or region affected not only that specific country or region but also wider regions or even the whole world. Migration was certainly not only caused by conflicts; Europe, e.g., received huge numbers of "guest workers" during the 1960s and 70s. The cold war and especially the post-cold war period witnessed migrations from the East to the West and also from the Balkans to wealthier countries. The conflicts within the gulf region such as the war in Iraq and later in Syria led to another flux of people in the region. Although the number of refugees and migrants was quite high, it did not lead to the problems and discussions we are facing today, which can be understood when having a closer look at policies implemented at that time.

Europe as a whole experienced many migration or refugee crises and tried to solve these through various measures such as passing new laws, calling the institutions of the EU for more cooperation or demanding actions on international level; the latest influx resulted again in changing legislation and demanding new policies to deal with the problem (Hinte et al., 2015: 12). Coordination on the European level and new implementations are demanded as reactions to the latest events. The refugee problem<sup>1</sup> is nothing new to the world or to Europe; there were about 18 million refugees worldwide in 1992. Although their number dropped to 9 million in 2009, figures have risen since then with 16,7 million in 2013, mostly from underdeveloped countries and especially from the Middle East (Rinne et al., 2015: 115). In 2014 the number of asylum applications was about 571.000 with 173.000 in Germany; in April 2015, the total number of asylum seekers of refugees in the country was 605.000 which meant a challenge for the national and local governments due to their accommodation or integration in social life (Brücker, 2015: 7). In 2014, the European Commission renamed its department

<sup>1</sup> The UN Refugee Agency defines refugees as "persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution" while migrants as persons "choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to

improve their lives by finding work or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons" (Edwards, 2016: www.unhcr.org)

Home Affairs to Migration and Home Affairs, which itself is a proof that the matter was and is given priority (Collett, 2015: 2).

The latest events can be considered as another turning point in the refugee problem especially in the Middle East and the EU since countries in both regions are largely affected by it and seek policies and cooperation to overcome it. In 2014, 2015 and most probably 2016, the number of refugees increased or will increase rapidly, with one country exposed to the problem more than the other. When looked at main destination countries it is possible to say that along with the USA, Germany has been a main country of destination -1/5 of application of the OECD are in Germany; (OECD, 2015: 27) – thus resulting in the change of migration politics on the national level (OECD, 2015:17 and 38). According to the *Migrationsbericht* (migration report) of the Federal Republic of Germany of 2014, there was an increase in immigration of about 15 % from 2013-14; the main groups were from Poland, followed by Romania and Bulgaria (OECD, 2015: 6). The response to this was especially new legislation in October 2015, which re-classifies countries of safe origin as Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, reduces the time for granting asylum, aims to realize payments in kind (now to be covered by the federal government) in order to avoid disincentives, offers integration courses for asylum seekers and tolerated persons with good perspectives, and supports the construction and renovations of accommodations (Effektive Verfahren, 2015: 8-13).

The migration report further defines the status of various types of migrations. Here, the definition of subsidiary protection is of great importance since it provides a quick response to the mass migration especially from Syria. The new legislation also grants rights such as participation in the labour market or the right to education after a 15-months stay. The right to stay in institutions for first admittance is now 6 months (OECD, 2015: 91-93). In the report, it is mentioned that applications for asylum are granted by 25 %; which shows that the right for subsidiary protection plays a crucial role to overcome the recent crisis (OECD, 2015: 102).

The issue of migration, or to put it in another way, the rights of asylum seekers or refugees is grounded in the human rights declaration of 1948. Based on the declaration, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees signed in 1951 is the text on which such rights are formulated today. However, it was limited to events happening before 1951 and made a difference between European and Non-European countries as countries of origin. With the amendment in 1967 temporal and geographic restrictions were removed related to the definition of refugees (Convention and Protocol Relating: 2). Thus, the definition of refugee is set in the Convention of 1951 and forms a base in the legislation of each country; the amendment in 1967 did not change the definition in its general terms but removed some limitations present in the convention. In 2004, the Council of the European Union set standards in terms of the status of refugees related to third country nationals or stateless persons. Thereby, member countries are required to set common criteria for the identification and minimum level of benefits (Gil-Bazo, 2006: 1). It further aims to remove incompatibilities between EC law and international law (Gil-Bazo, 2006: 3); so, should there exist an incompatibility in the refugee issue, priority is to be given to pre-existing international treaties (Gil-Bazo, 2006: 3). EU institutions like the European Council or the European Court of Justice have

legislative, executive or judicial competences relevant to UNHCR's mandate; therefore, the UN refugee agency follows EU law and policies in the area and collaborates with EU institutions (Working with the European Union: www.unhcr.org). The proposals of the UNHCR to the Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey is another example of how the issue is dealt in collaboration on the global level; this includes topics like providing effective systems for allocating responsibility for asylum-seekers and systems to protect unaccompanied and separated children, or implementing hotspot approaches and the relocation schemes (Stabilizing the situation of refugees, 2016: www.unhcr.org). Such implementations are presented in the reports or plans of the UN such as the Global Report of UNHCR 2014 and 3RP for 2016-17. They show how institutions of the UN and governments work together to solve the problem; they include issues like registration and protection of children to cooperation with governments and NGOs. The strategy of 3RP is to strengthen national capacity to ensure sustainability and contribute to social cohesion (3RP: 19).

## 2. Migration in Turkey

Turkey has a long history of migration including the Ottoman experience especially in the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> and first two decades of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (examined in detail by Kale, 2014:253-257). During the establishment of new Republic, Turkey faced various types of migrations, the most significant of which was the population exchange between Turkey and Greece based on a convention signed in Lausanne Treaty, and then with Bulgaria where many Turks were living (Çelebi, Pehlivan, 2016: 26-27). Throughout 1980s and 90s, mostly ethnic Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria, Bosnia and Kosovo moved to Turkey (Düvell, 2014:89) and Iraq (Sirkeci: 2005) and finally Syria. Today, Turkey transformed from a transit country to a country of destination and, therefore, did reforms, passed new laws, and reorganized its bureaucratic structure to respond to the problem (OECD, 2015: 38). However, the uncertainties in the Syrian refugee crisis meant not only a challenge to politics but also to the public in general; there are many types of mistrust causing tensions within the Turkish population and the refugees (Erdoğan, 2015: 61-62).

Turkey is a main destination to many migrants and refugees due to two main reasons; it attracts migration because of its proximity to flashpoints in the middle east and also because it leads an open border policy. The changes in legislation in 2013 can be described as an attempt to regulate migration and that it will keep its position as a target destination. Above all, it was enacted because of the urgent situation relating to the Syrian refugee crisis. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection passed in 2013 addresses migration and asylum issues, regulates visa and permit conditions, sets legal frameworks for stateless persons, irregular migrants, asylum seekers (OECD, 2015: 38). The Directorate General for Migration Management was founded with the mentioned law and is established within the Ministry of Interior; migration was previously organised by the police department in Turkey. It is no surprise that Turkey passed laws, changed regulation and procedures with the latest influx because with the arrival of Syrian refugees Turkey became the 6<sup>th</sup> largest recipient of refugees in the world (Kirişçi, 2014: 8).

The new law defines a refugee as a person in danger due to various reasons like ethnicity or religion, and comes from a European country, whereas a conditional refugee seeks refuge

because of events in countries other than Europe. Subsidiary protection is granted for persons who do not fall into the two categories mentioned above but are in serious danger (Law on Foreigners and International Protection, 2014: 29). Section three sets the rules and access to services for international protection beneficiaries –such as access to primary and secondary education, medical assistance, labour market etc. (Law on Foreigners and International Protection, 2014: 43). Article 95 states that accommodation of these persons is to be arranged by themselves; however, the directorate may establish accommodation centres with the priority for those in urgent need (Law on Foreigners and International Protection, 2014: 46). Apart from founding new institutions or passing laws, Turkey revised its present visa policies and implementation; e.g. visa policies for Iraqis changed –that is, application at the border is not possible any more (Report From the Commission, 2016: 8).

### 3. The Syrian refugee crisis and responses

Although Turkey is one of the main destinations for Syrian refugees (here, it should be mentioned that next to Turkey's open border policy, previous relations with Syria such as visa liberalization led also to the mass migration from Syria; they could enter the country by just presenting their passports, (Kirişçi, 2014: 14), the past months have clearly shown that Europe was and is the destination region for refugees. Nevertheless, the number of Syrian refugees in the EU is much fewer than any other country in the region due to the regulations and procedures to enter the EU. This can even be observed in the latest events taking place on various national borders within the EU, like Macedonia or Hungary. Furthermore, the events prove also that securing borders is not and cannot be a solution, since it only led to the rise of illegal immigration.

Meetings of EU organs in the years 2015-16 clearly show that the EU is looking for solutions within the EU and is seeking cooperation. In 15.12.2015, e.g., the Commission proposed a voluntary humanitarian admission scheme with Turkey. Other proposals within the same context included regulations related to borders and coast guard, progress reports on hotspots in countries like Greece or Italy and revision of the Schengen border (Commission Proposals, 2015, ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs). In October of the same year, the Commission decided to take action due to the refugee crisis, which aimed to alleviate pressures on countries most affected – especially Greece, Hungary and Italy – by relocating 120.000 refugees. It further offered to set a common list of safe countries of origin such as Albania, Kosovo or Turkey (Refugee Crisis: European Commission, 2015: ec.europa.eu). The European Commission issued a proposal for council regulation in March 2013 in order to set a base for emergency support in Europe (Proposal for Council, 2016). Such an emergency support was approved for Greece, which aims to provide food, shelter, water, medicine etc. (Refugee crisis: Council shows solidarity, 2016: www.consilium.europa.eu). There have been also various responses to the refugee issue within European countries; Germany, e.g., often called for more coordination to solve the crisis and created a committee to integrate such matters into its foreign policy (Collett, 2015: 3).

One further response to the crisis is the involvement of third countries, especially Turkey. Negotiations with Turkey are conducted in order to find a solution to the problem and

provide benefits in return (Weseli, 2015:www.dw.com/de). European countries also reclassified their lists of third countries of safe origin; Germany, for instance, graded Balkan countries and North African countries like Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia as safe countries (Sydow et al., 2016: www.spiegel.de), thus making applications from these countries invalid.

### 4. The refugee problem in Turkey

Turkey is one of the countries directly affected by the crisis from the year 2011 on, when the Syrian civil war started. Although Lebanon, Iraq, or Jordan heavily experienced migration flows, it is possible to say that the situation with and in Turkey was different. One reason is that the capacity of Turkey is higher than the others and thus received more refugees and opened its borders when the war started. The other, and probably primary reason, is the possibility to migrate to the EU through Turkey. It is estimated that there are almost 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey settled in all parts of the country. When the crisis first started, Turkey was overwhelmed with the new situation. Until then, it did not have a proper legislation to cope with the problem; furthermore, it was not prepared both in financial and administrative terms to handle the crisis.

When the uprisings in Syria first started, it was believed that it would take a turn like in Egypt or other countries gone through the Arab Spring. However, this proved to be misleading since it turned to a long-lasting civil war and caused people to flee out of the country to neighbouring regions. By October 2012, more than 100.000 Syrians passed the border and settled in the Southern parts of Turkey; a fact that was described in the Turkish media and public as “passing the psychological limit/border” (Çalık, 2012: www.sabah.com.tr). The number increased on a daily basis since then, and soon became a problem felt almost in all parts of the country. The Turkish government covered the needs of those settled in camps but most of them provided their own accommodation and other needs. However, it should be mentioned that charity organisations in every town of Turkey did a great work in covering the need of the refugees. They often provided shelters, food, clothing and other basic needs; medical care was met by the government. Education for the refugee children could not be organized in the first years although there had been various attempts, such as the opportunity for Syrian university students to continue their studies in Turkey. This attempt was only considered for the years 2012-13, which proves that it was believed the crisis would have been solved within a short period of time. In 2014, the directorates for national education took measures to include Syrian children in the educational system in Turkey, which were 12.000 in Istanbul alone (Suriyeli çocuklar, 2014:haber.star.com.tr). This year, Syrian teachers were given the right to teach in various schools in Turkey, especially in Arabic. According to the report of the Commission of 4.3.2016, 350.000 refugee children were enrolled in schools in Turkey, and about 150.000 babies were born in camps (Report From the Commission, 2016:6). There is certainly still a huge number of children in school age and not enrolled but it can be said there has been significant progress to include Syrian children to the educational system. For instance, prefabricated schools were built as temporary education centres and teacher incentives and trainings were set as main targets (3RP: 35).

## 5. Refugees and Turkey-EU relations

While Turkey was trying to overcome the refugee problems, it also demanded to cooperate on the European level since the crisis in Syria had not ended and grew bigger resulting in more and more refugees seeking shelter in Turkey. Most of the European countries, on the other hand did not assume any responsibility in the matter. When the crisis started to be felt first in Southern parts and later in central parts of Europe, the response of some were to close down borders or act indifferent in order to discourage refugees to come to their countries. Countries facing the problem immediately were Italy, Greece (both with previous experiences in migration), and Macedonia. As mentioned above, EU member states responded in many different ways such as creating a common list of countries of safe origin, passing new legislation or providing more cooperation. The German Minister of the Interior paid a visit to Tunisia, Morocco and Algiers, which were declared safe countries of origin so that refoulement to these countries would be possible, and asked for more cooperation with them (Lau, 2016, [www.zeit.de](http://www.zeit.de)). This was not the only measure taken by the EU in order to solve the problem – the negotiations with Turkey over the past months are further undertakings of the EU in order to respond to the problem. On 29 November 2015, an EU-Turkey summit was held to discuss and activate an action plan, which aims to enhance cooperation and primarily stop irregular migration flows to the EU. Some commitments of Turkey were registration of migrants, provision of access to public services, strengthening the Turkish Coast Guard, prevention of irregular migration and alignment of Turkish and EU visa policies. The commitments of the EU, on the other hand, were mobilising new funds, supporting present resettlement programmes, strengthen the capacity of Turkey to fight against migrant smuggling or coordination with Turkey for the return of irregular migrants (EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 2016: [ec.europa.eu](http://ec.europa.eu)). This joint action plan led to the decrease of migration flows to the EU (Altuntaş, 2016: [dha.com.tr](http://dha.com.tr)) – though not at the level the EU is demanding. Based on the joint action plan institutions of the EU and Turkey have come together to discuss and talk over the progress realized so far.

One report in this sense was issued by the Commission presented to the European Parliament and the Council on March 4, 2016. The report shows that illegal migration has weakened over the past months, despite an increase in the last few weeks. Thus, Turkey is expected to do further progress in the prevention of irregular migration and migrant smuggling (Report From the Commission, 2016: 10). The progress report gives also information on how much was allocated to Turkey by the EU for the basic needs of Syrian refugees; so far 90 million Euros were used for requirements like food or sanitation and a further 55 million will be provided for education. The EU agreed to support the Turkish Coast Guard with 20 million Euros (Report From the Commission, 2016: 8-9).

Since November 2015 European Council Members met with their Turkish counterpart for several times in order to deepen EU-Turkey relations and to address the migration crisis. As agreed, the EU has begun disbursing the 3 billion Euros for projects to overcome the crisis and at the same time started to work on visa liberalisation. Furthermore, the opening of Chapter 17 showed that negotiations for the membership of Turkey in the EU were on the agenda. The EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016 set clear goals for the joint action

plan against irregular migration. Thereby, irregular migrants from Turkey would be returned to Turkey (that includes migrants who did not apply for asylum or who are found inadmissible), for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greek Islands another Syrian would be resettled from Turkey, 3 billion Euros would be allocated for the Facility of Refugees (after the resources are used to the full, another funding of about 3 billion will be provided by the end of 2018) (EU-Turkey Statement, 2016, [www.consilium.europa.eu](http://www.consilium.europa.eu)).

During the March 2016 refugee deal between Turkey and EU, there were warnings from the Foreign Affairs Committee MEPs in a report dated 15 March 2016 saying “EU-Turkey cooperation on migration should not be linked to the calendar, content and conditionality of the negotiation process” and “...outsourcing the refugee crisis to Turkey is not a credible long-term solution to the problem” (MEPs insist, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)) along with some instant reactions connected to human rights issues and practical matters such as logistical challenges (Duvell, 2016: <http://fortune.com>; Collett; 2016: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org>). After the resignation of the former Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was eager to realize the deal of March 2016, the future of the refugee deal became questionable in Brussels (EU Unsure, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). According to the “Turkey’s progress on the visa liberalisation roadmap” Turkish authorities should fulfil 72 requirements in order to be enlisted on the visa-free list of the European Union (Turkey’s progress, 2016: <http://ec.europa.eu>).

As of 4th May 2016, 66 of these requirements were fulfilled or almost fulfilled, 3 partially fulfilled and 3 not fulfilled (Turkey’s Visa Liberation Scorecard, 2016: [www.esiweb.org](http://www.esiweb.org)). Especially the benchmark on anti-terror laws, article 65 is said to be refused by the government of Turkey (Fragile progress, 2016: [www.politico.eu](http://www.politico.eu); Rankin et al. 2016, [www.theguardian.com](http://www.theguardian.com)), which is about revising the “legal framework as regards organised crime and terrorism, as well as its interpretation by the courts and by security forces and the law enforcement agencies, so as to ensure the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, of assembly and association in practice” (Turkey’s progress, 2016: <http://ec.europa.eu>). This has become and possibly will be a critical issue especially after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 and the developments in the Syria and Iraq borders of Turkey.

On the other hand, under the refugee deal, the numbers of refugees decreased sharply, a decrease of over 95% since May 2016 according to a European Commission Q&A Report (Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement, 2016: <http://europa.eu>). The total number of refugees taken by Turkey since April 2016 is 721 and 82 of these are Syrian refugees according to the data of the Directorate General of Migration Management of Turkey by 28.11.2016 (4 Nisan 2016 tarihinden itibaren, 2016: [www.goc.gov.tr](http://www.goc.gov.tr)). But as Rankin et al. (2016: [www.theguardian.com](http://www.theguardian.com)) of the Guardian noted, the process is not problem-free referring to the tiny number of Syrians taken by Europe and the risks for the deal based on Turkey’s opposition to change the anti-terror laws.

Along with the on-going debate, after Merkel’s doubts on Turkish democracy and the timeline of the visa-free travel (Merkel warns Erdogan, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)), Erdoğan warned the European Union that the Turkish Parliament will block the refugee deal if no visa-free travel is granted (Erdogan

says Turkish parliament, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). Erdoğan also criticised European leaders, in an interview with German ARD Television, as not being sincere about Syria refugee deal as “Turkey stands by its commitment with regard to refugees” but the Europeans didn’t keep their promise for the visa-free travel agreement (Turkey’s Erdoğan criticises, 2016: [www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)). His critics went on regarding the failure of the promise of €3 billion aid for the refugees, but European Commission’s chief spokesman Margaritis Schinassaid that the EU was holding to its commitments and declared that the EU had mobilized €3 billion and out of this about €740 million had already been allocated; and clarified that the money was not intended for Turkey and its government but for refugees and the host communities (Erdoğan starts dispute, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com))<sup>2</sup>. Similarly, FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu reiterated the arguments in an interview with *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* saying if visa liberalisation did not follow, they would be forced to back away from the deal on taking back (refugees) and the agreement of 18 March. But these assertions were accepted as blackmailing in reply of S&D Vice-President Knut Fleckenstein stating that Turkey should fulfil the relevant benchmarks and Turkey was moving in the wrong direction in reaction to the recent coup attempt. “We will not be blackmailed into accepting visa liberalisation by an increasingly autocratic regime in Ankara” (Turkey to back, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). All these debates raised the tension between Turkey and EU and a recent 4 August 2016 survey, conducted following the discussions in Germany, put forth the support for migration deal is only 35% and 66% of the participants want the EU accession talks broken off (Poll: Majority of Germans, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). Nevertheless, Nas (2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)) points to possible opportunities both for Turkey and EU based on the refugee issue. Referring to the afterwards of coup attempt, Nas (2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)) says that EU could “make a positive impact in the direction of greater rights and freedoms only if it engages with Ankara” and “...Lifting of visas for Turkish citizens could be the least that the EU can accomplish as a tangible sign of appreciation for Turkey’s cooperation and burden-sharing regarding the refugee crisis.”

But the recent developments show that the EU-Turkey relations seem again at a turning point. The tensions increased with the declarations of both parties. For example, President Erdoğan accused Germany of being a haven for terrorists (Ankara prepares to try, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). The EU part insists on the improvements on the issues such as the detention of opposition journalists and reinstatement of the death penalty. The EP Vice President Lamsdorff said “...nothing will proceed with visa-free travel” referring to detentions and death penalty discussions (Turkey visa deal 'unlikely', 2016: [www.dw.com](http://www.dw.com)). Similarly, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker warned Erdoğan that he would be held responsible if Ankara fails to meet EU criteria for granting Turks visa-free travel by referring to the criteria that need to be met by Turkey including the anti-terrorism law (EU’s Juncker warns, 2016: <http://www.reuters.com>). Turkey once again threatens the EU to end the migration deal (Winter, 2016: [www.dw.com](http://www.dw.com)) and FM Çavuşoğlu says “We are truly fed up of these statements degrading Turkey. The criteria are clear but there are double

standards and a two-faced approach” in reply to EU criticism over human right issues (Turkey say it’s tired of, 2016: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). Later in November, before the EP decision of freezing Turkey membership talks, President Erdoğan told reporters, when returning from Uzbekistan, that the ‘Shanghai Five’ might be an alternative for Turkey (President Erdoğan: EU not, 2016: [www.hurriyetdailynews.com](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com)). Finally, at this stage, the process of refugee deal and visa-free travel which began in March 2016 got to a serious crisis point and EP temporarily froze the EU accession talks with Turkey in 24.11.2016 (Freeze EU, 2016: [www.europarl.europa.eu](http://www.europarl.europa.eu)).

## 6. Discussions and the future of the crisis

The latest refugee crisis led to the revision of policies, measures, or regulations. One such example was the discussion about the Dublin Regulation, which sets rules on how to organize the asylum applications on the European level; thus, the member state, in which the application was made, was held responsible and multiple asylum claims could be deterred. It was in effect in 1997 due to the Schengen agreement and aimed to determine a common asylum policy. The latest agreement, Dublin III, came into force in 2013 to set rules on the application and the responsibilities of the member states (Geis et al. 2015: 12). However, with the latest Syrian refugee crisis countries like Germany did not apply the rule and did not send the refugees back to the country of entrance (Dernbach, 2015: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)). In order to negotiate the matter, the European Commission has adopted a Communication for the reform of the Common European Asylum System, which presents options for the solution of the current crisis. One suggested option is to change the system, thus making the deportation of asylum seekers to the country of first entry impossible. The other option is to keep the present system with an emergency clause to cope with the problem (Cendrowitz et al., 2016: [www.independent.co.uk](http://www.independent.co.uk)). Which policies will be adopted remains not clear since there seems to be no ideal solution with each country having different interests. Supporters of the second action, e.g., claim that statistics prove that border countries of the EU did not necessarily take more refugees than the others as it was the case with Spain (Geis et al. 2015: 13); thus a change of the Dublin system is not an answer to the current crisis.

With the first option, on the other hand, it is argued that changes need to be made on the European level; otherwise, countries like Italy or Greece have to take a heavy burden. It is also claimed that present actions and regulations usually consider only legal or security matters; whereas the problems are not restricted to these but include issues such as integration or labour market (Rinne et al, 2015: 118). Such demands - that is to solve the issue on the European level and by jointly taking on responsibility - often come from the German side since it is the main EU country dealing with the issue without just restricting the flow of migrants. Countries like Denmark, Netherlands, Poland do not want to take any refugees, Austria is not willing to take more, and countries in the North remain silent in the matter (Brenke, 2015: 879). Thus the question on which countries will assume responsibility remains an unanswered one; there are millions of refugees out there with a Europe ready to take only thousands. When compared to

<sup>2</sup> As of the end of October 2016, the aid figures are € 2 239 542 782 committed/decided, € 1 251 615 252 contracted and € 676 600 395

disbursed (Facility for Refugees in Turkey: projects committed/decided, contracted, disbursed – Status on 27/10/2016)

Lebanon, e.g., taking one million refugees, Germany had to take 16 million (Bunde, 2014: 245).

The existing refugee problem cannot be overcome through higher walls or exclusion of migrants since migration flows will not stop no matter what type of deterrent is used. Thus, a better solution would be finding ways for better coordination through bilateral agreements etc. (Hinte et al. 2015: 10). Such demands can be found, e.g., in various reports published in Germany. The *Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration* in Germany suggests to set certain quotas and directly accept the refugees since the migration flow will not stop and lead to illegal and dangerous travel routes. This is partly implemented at the moment, but some criteria applied in the process are needed to be changed (Scholz, 2015: www.dw.com).

It is not easy or even possible to say how the negotiations within EU members and EU-Turkey will come out. Although there seems to be an agreement on both sides, it does not ensure that the crisis will be solved. For instance, Turkey agreed that it will take the refugees from Greece back and in turn resettles a Syrian refugee in Europe. This, however, is limited to the quotas set by the EU countries. A further doubt is if Turkey will be able to secure its borders especially to the European side. The other side of the coin is the attitude of EU member states and how they will assume responsibility in the matter. Germany took a leading role in both addressing Europe for more cooperation and opening or increasing quotas for Syrian refugees. Eralp (2016: 21-22) states the factors emerging on the lead of Germany as Germany carries the bulk of the refugee burden, Merkel's efforts to find a common European solution to the refugee crisis in order to prevent an existential solidarity crisis in the Union and Germany's wish to combat xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment.

This can hardly be seen in any other European country; some decided to close their border, not just because they did not want any refugees but merely because their neighbouring countries implemented such a policy, which left the first countries with all the migrants to deal with it. Such a case is Macedonia because Austria decided it was enough to have 100.000 refugees; it closed its borders leaving Macedonia to deal with the issue on its own.

As mentioned above the recent refugee crisis has and will have results in various results one of which –and probably the most important- is the financing of the organisation of the crisis. And, extension of the deal might lead to rising costs (Okuy et al., 2016:16). In order to solve the problem, there are certainly various suggestions, e.g. in Germany, such as the foundation of a "Refugee Impact Fund" through which the cost of education etc. will be covered along with the support of other institutions (Dohmen, 2015: 16). There is another aspect applied on the administrative level which is criticised on the grounds that they cause more conflict within communities: the settlement of refugees in small towns. Their settlement in towns and cities could provide better integration because entering the labour market or social life here is much easier; thus, allowing a smooth transition when granted asylum (Brücker, 2015: 10). Serbos et al. (2016: 404) suggest EU redirect financial, organizational and political support to Greece and Italy and EC should direct the resources to develop a medium term funding mechanism for the coming period.

The situation in Turkey, however, is quite different both due to its location, that is its proximity to the region, and the

policies it adopted. Turkey has implemented an open border policy from the beginning on, applied non-refoulement, and registered the refugees with Turkish authorities. However, Syrian refugees were first considered as "guests" and tolerated as temporary migrants; thus it did not have a clear and defined policy to the situation (Özden, 2013: 5, Kirişçi, 2014: 14). Their organization was assisted by the UNHCR and local NGOs; the support of the UN was mainly technical as proper registration and identification of refugees along with AFAD, and donation of 28 million dollars from 2011 to 2013. The Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) has access to the camps and has undertaken relief operations such as providing shelter, food or healthcare. It set up mobile kitchens within camps, ensured the transfer of patients in camps to hospitals, and voiced the problem on the international level (Özden, 2013: 6-8). The involvement of the mentioned organizations is still valid today; however, with the foundation of a directorate for migration, the process is coordinated by this directorate. The cooperation of organizations of the UN and the Turkish government are also presented in the reports of the UN such as the Global Report of the UNHCR in 2014 and the 3RP for 2016-17. Both reports provide information on the coordination and involvement of the UN along with governments in the region and set the aims of the UN, which is protection from refoulement, efficient registration, assistance in preventing sexual violence due to displacement (UNHCR Global Report, 2014: 178).

Turkish authorities face various challenges caused by inner problems since the refugee crisis has effects on certain social aspects. One such challenge is their influence in the labour market; it is known that child labour, a problem Turkey could overcome in general, is again a fact in the daily life. Another and maybe much more serious problem is cheap and illegal labour caused by Syrian refugees. Although Turkey passed a law making the employment of refugees possible in the labour market, illegal employment and cheap labour is still practiced causing tensions within the local communities. However, it should also be mentioned that Syrian workers could mean a chance for certain regions in Turkey, such as Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa where the need for labour in agriculture is high and cannot be covered with local workers. A further opportunity for the region is the fact that companies based in Aleppo settled to the region and started their businesses here due to the proximity to the region and previous business relationships. There are small enterprises founded by Syrian refugees, thus providing employment for themselves and others. Nevertheless, this led to conflicts between them and local shop-owners because they were seen as competitors (Orhan et al. 2015: 17-18).

Tensions arose not only because of economic problems but also due to social challenges; one such example is child marriage and the increase in divorce. It is assumed that the divorce rate in regions where Syrian refugees are settled increased by 20 %; such a case is Kilis (Orhan et al. 2015: 16). The reason for this is that religious marriages as opposed to civil marriages are considered legitimate within the Syrian community and some parts of Turkey, making child marriage or polygamy possible. Another source of tension was and is the change in the housing market since refugee families share a flat to be able to cover the rent, thus leading to a rise in the rents of houses and flats. It should, however, be mentioned that the flats and houses they rented are usually old and worn out leaving the families under bad housing conditions.

## 7. Refugees, EU and Turkey: An uncertain future with opportunities

There are various challenges both for the region and especially for Turkey, the first is definitely the uncertainty of the near future. That means, it is still unknown which policy to adopt for the solution of the crisis. One is their return which seems unlikely, the other resettlement in third countries; the latter, too, is not easy to carry out since the global public did not react to the calls of the UNHCR to take more refugees. Thus, the third option, that is the integration of present refugees, seems to be the more probable case (Kirişçi, 2014: 19). Turkish authorities need to revise their legislation in terms of citizenship and residence and find long-term solutions (Kaya et al. 2015: 72-73).

On the other hand, as Trombetta (2014:38) stated in his paper discussing the the Syrian crisis as viewed from the Middle East, *“The perception of the EU policy from the outside is that there is a wide gap between rhetoric and the EU’s real ability to support and intervene. This is contributing to a loss of credibility of European action.”* Regarding this, Turkey’s demand for more international cooperation has fallen on deaf ears; the latest negotiations with the EU do not provide a long-term solution and furthermore leaves the country on its own with the problem (what the EU offered is merely limited to provide funds and take some of the refugees, but both are limited in number).

Thus Turkey has to be aware of the situation and find better ways of integration; furthermore, it needs to prepare the public, better inform refugees about their rights and duties, meet needs in education, and draw labour into the market through formal ways (Kirişçi, 2014: 43). The burden on local authorities caused by the flux of migrants in certain regions is quite high, so the share cities obtain from the local government should also include the number of refugees settled in such cities (Orhan et al. 2015: 20).

There are initiatives making recommendations in order to ease the problems caused by the crisis, and suggesting improvements in job training, language acquisition, partnership with the private sector, capacity enhancement of municipalities, and promotion of social cohesion (3RP: 45). The integration of the refugees must be supported with education and schooling, which should not include only children but also adults in terms of vocational training in order to ease their way both if they want to return to their countries or decide to stay and apply for asylum in their hosting country. Such issues need cooperation among the central government, local authorities and non-governmental organizations (Kaya et al. 2015: 71).

## 8. Conclusions

The latest refugee crisis had significant effects on the EU-Turkey relationship. Though not spoken out loud, the negotiations were suspended for a while and were taken up again unexpectedly due to the Syrian crisis and refugees trying to reach Europe through Turkey. Migration is nothing new to Europe; however, the influx of migrants rushing mainly from the shores of Turkey since 2014 seems to have caused a panic within Europe, despite its capability to take many refugees. The attempt of EU authorities to set a deal with Turkey damaged in a way the basic values of humanity. It further conducted accession negotiations with Turkey though these two issues were not directly linked to each other and related readmission agreements with issues like visa-free travel; all

these lead to an impression that the EU lacked policies on how to manage the process. Thus, the EU needs to revise and re-evaluate all these matters.

While Turkey is struggling to provide the best it can for the people leaving their countries, the world seems to ignore the fact. The unpleasant deal of Turkey and the EU related to the refugees, the adjournment of regulation on the violation of human rights, which leads to criticism in Turkey, the coup attempt which the “civilized” world seems to overlook, all caused many troubles in the country. However, although the state of emergency is justified by the coup attempt, it leaves Turkey in a difficult position in defending itself over the violations in the media and politics.

In this context, Turkey needs to set up regulations for the improvement of human rights; and the European Union, on the other hand, needs to fulfil the obligations it agreed on in order to decrease the number refugees between Turkey and Greece and to develop more acceptable policies in regard to new possible migration flows. The European Parliament recently decided to freeze its negotiations with Turkey temporarily; this should be considered as an opportunity for both sides to evaluate their positions and to proceed their relations in a more realistic and clear manner.

*(An earlier draft of this paper was presented by Seyma Akin at Young Women Leaders Forum 2016 Challenges and Opportunities in the Middle East, 12-14 april 2016, Gaziantep and only the abstract was published in the conference proceedings book. This paper is the updated and extended version of the presentation by the authors)*

## References

- 3RP Regional Refugee Resilience Plan 2016-17 in Response to the Syrian Crisis, <http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- 4 Nisan 2016 Tarihinden itibaren teslim alınan düzensiz göçmenler, Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, [http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/geri-alim\\_363\\_378\\_10093\\_icerik](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/geri-alim_363_378_10093_icerik), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Altuntaş, Öykü (2016).“Turkey-EU joint action plan implementation report claims decline in refugee flow”, [http://dha.com.tr/en-son-haber-turkeyeu-joint-action-plan-implementation-report-claims-decline-in-refugee-flow-son-dakika-haberleri\\_1165892.html](http://dha.com.tr/en-son-haber-turkeyeu-joint-action-plan-implementation-report-claims-decline-in-refugee-flow-son-dakika-haberleri_1165892.html), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Ankara prepares to try coup suspects, attacks Germany, 03.11.2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/ankara-prepares-to-try-coup-suspects-attacks-germany/>(retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Brenke, Karl (2015). “Flüchtlinge sind sehr ungleich auf die EU-Länder verteilt - auch bezogen auf die Wirtschaftskraft und Einwohnerzahl” DIW-Wochenbericht, Vol. 82, Issue 39: 867-881.
- Brücker, Herbert (2015). “Zur Integration von Flüchtlingen”.IABStellungnahme, No. 5/2015<http://doku.iab.de/stellungnahme/2015/sn0515.pdf>(retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Bunde, Tobias (2014). “Deutsche Verantwortung, transatlantische Verstimmung und syrische Verzweiflung. Ein Bericht über die 50. Münchner

- Sicherheitskonferenz". *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, April 2014, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 237-250
- Cendrowicz, Leo and Oliver Wright (2016). "EU unveils plans to overhaul asylum system in an attempt to address chaotic influx of refugees" *The Independent*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-eu-unveils-plans-to-overhaul-asylum-system-in-an-attempt-to-address-chaotic-influx-of-a6971751.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Collett Elizabeth (2016). "The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal", *Migration Policy*, March 2016, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Collett, Elizabeth (2015). "The Development of EU Policy on Immigration and Asylum" *Policy Brief Series*, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPIE-Asylum-Mechanics-Brief.pdf>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Commission proposals, (2015). "Borders Package and Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme with Turkey" *Reports on Migration in Greece, Italy and the Western Balkans*, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151215\\_1\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151215_1_en.htm), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Çalık, Burcu (2012) "Mülteci sayısı psikolojik sınırı aştı" *Sabah*, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2012/10/16/multeci-sayisi-psikolojik-siniri-asti>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Çelebi, Özlem, Özlem Pehlivan (2016). The impact of mass migrations on immigration policy of Turkey, in *Turkish Migration 2016 Selected Papers* compiled by Deniz Eroglu, Jeffrey H. Cohen, İbrahim Sirkeci, Transnational Press London, 26-30
- Dernbach, Andrea (2015). "Germany suspends Dublin Agreement for Syrian refugees", <https://www.euractiv.com/section/migrations/news/germany-suspends-dublin-agreement-for-syrian-refugees/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Dohmen, Dieter (2015). "Ein Refugee Impact Fund zur Finanzierung von Bildung und Qualifizierung für Flüchtlinge", *FiBS-Forum*, No. 57 [http://www.fibs.eu/de/sites/\\_wgData/FiBS-Forum\\_057\\_RIF-Refugee%20Impact%20Fund.pdf](http://www.fibs.eu/de/sites/_wgData/FiBS-Forum_057_RIF-Refugee%20Impact%20Fund.pdf) (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Dublin Regulation: What is the Dublin System, <http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/10-dublin-regulation.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Duvell Franck (2016). "The EU's Deal With Turkey Is a No-Win Situation" *Fortune*, March 22, 2016, <http://fortune.com/2016/03/22/eu-turkey-deal-no-win-situation/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Düvell Franck (2014). "Turkey's Transition to an Immigration Country: A Paradigm Shift" *Insight Turkey* Vol. 16 / No. 4 / 2014, 87-103
- Edwards Adrian (2016), UNHCR viewpoint: 'Refugee or 'migrant'-Which is right?', <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html> (retrieved 22.06.2017)
- Effektive Verfahren, frühe Integration (2015), <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2015/10/2015-10-15-asyl-fluechtlingspolitik.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Eralp, N. A. (2016). "Challenges of the German-Led Refugee Deal between Turkey and the EU" In *CESifo Forum*, Ifo Institute-Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Vol. 17, No. 2: 21-24.
- Erdogan says Turkish parliament will block EU refugee deal if no visa-free travel, 25 May 2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/erdogan-says-turkey-parliament-will-block-eu-refugee-deal-if-no-visa-free-travel/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Erdogan starts dispute over migrant deal, 26.07.2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/erdogan-starts-dispute-over-migrant-deal/> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Erdoğan, M. Murat (2015). *Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research*. Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre Publications, Ankara. <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/46184> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- EU unsure if Davutoglu's resignation will affect refugee deal, 06.05.2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-unsure-if-davutoglus-resignation-will-affect-refugee-deal/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- EU's Juncker warns Turkey's Erdogan on visa deal, 8.11.2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-eu-juncker-idUSKBN1331EI>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report (2016), [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing\\_the\\_refugee\\_crisis\\_-\\_eu-turkey\\_join\\_action\\_plan\\_implementation\\_report\\_20160210\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-turkey_join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en.pdf), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- EU-Turkey Statement (2016) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Facility for Refugees in Turkey: projects committed/decided, contracted, disbursed – Status on 27/10/2016, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news\\_corner/migration/20161027-frit-table.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/migration/20161027-frit-table.pdf), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Fischer, Justina A.V. (2015). "And Angela Merkel is right: the refugees as opportunity for renewing German society", <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67315/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Fragile progress on EU-Turkey migration deal, 15.06.2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/visa-deadline-fragile-progress-on-eu-turkey-migration-deal/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Freeze EU accession talks with Turkey until it halts repression, urge MEPs, 24.11.2016,

- <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161117IPR51549/freeze-eu-accession-talks-with-turkey-until-it-halts-repression-urge-meps>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Geis, Wido and Anja Katrin Orth (2015). „Flüchtlinge: Herausforderung und Chance für Deutschland“, IW policy paper, No. 26/2015 <http://doku.iab.de/externe/2015/k150904r13.pdf> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Gil-Bazo, Maria-Teresa (2006). “Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to Be Granted Asylum Under Ec Law” UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee, Research Paper No. 136; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 54/2006. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=951097>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Hinte, Holger et al. (2015). Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Realismus statt Illusionen, IZA Standpunkte, No. 83 <http://ftp.iza.org/sp83.pdf> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement, 15.06.2016, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-16-1664\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.pdf), SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=951097> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- İltica Göç İşlemleri, <https://www.egm.gov.tr/sayfalar/iltica-goc-islemleri.aspx>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Kafsack ,Hendrik and Michael Stabenow (2016) “Brüsseler Tauschgeschäfte”, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/zuversicht-vor-eu-gipfel-mit-der-tuerkei-14128972.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Kale Basak, “Transforming an Empire: The Ottoman Empire’s Immigration and Settlement Policies in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, *Middle Eastern Studies* vol 50, no 2 (2014) p. 252-271
- Kaya, İbrahim and Esra Y. Eren (2015). Türkiye’deki Suriyelilerin Hukuki Durumu Arada Kalanların Hakları ve Yükümlülükleri, Seta Yayınları.
- Kirişçi, Kemal (2014). “Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality” <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2014/05/12-turkey-syrian-refugees-kirischi/syrian-refugees-and-turkeys-challenges-may-14-2014.pdf> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Lau, Miriam (2016). “Die zurückgepiffenen Söhne” (2016, 17 March) <http://www.zeit.de/2016/11/fluechtlings-rueckfuehrung-algerien-marokko-tunesien>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2014), Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management Publications Publishing Number: 8, [http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng\\_minikanun\\_5\\_son.pdf](http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_minikanun_5_son.pdf), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Meeting, of the heads of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement (2015, 29 Nov), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/29-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- MEPs insist Turkish accession process should be decoupled from refugee deal, 16.03.2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/meps-insist-turkish-accession-process-should-be-decoupled-from-refugee-deal/> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Merkel warns Erdogan his authoritarian drift endangers visa deal, 24 May 2016, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/merkel-warns-erdogan-his-authoritarian-drift-endangers-visa-deal/> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung (2014), Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, [https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2014.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Nas Çiğdem (2016). “Time for EU to deliver on visa liberalisation promises” 07.09.2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/time-for-eu-to-deliver-on-visa-liberalisation-promises/> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- OECD (2015). *International Migration Outlook 2015*, OECD Publishing, Paris, [http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr\\_outlook-2015-en](http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2015-en), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Okyay, A., , J. Zaragoza-Cristiani (2016). “The Leverage of the Gatekeeper: Power and Interdependence in the Migration Nexus between the EU and Turkey” *The International Spectator*, 1-16. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2016.1235403> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Orhan, Oytun and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar (2015). Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Türkiye’ye Etkileri, ORSAM ve TESEV Rapor No 195.
- Poll: Majority of Germans want to end Ankara’s EU hopes, 08.08.2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/poll-majority-of-germans-want-to-end-ankaras-eu-hopes-and-migration-deal/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- President Erdoğan: EU not everything, Turkey may join Shanghai Five, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 20.11.2016, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-not-everything-turkey-may-join-shanghai-pact-president-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=106321&NewsCatID=338>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Proposal for a Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union, (2016, 2 March) [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/EU\\_Emergency\\_Support/Council\\_Regulation\\_Provision\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/EU_Emergency_Support/Council_Regulation_Provision_en.pdf), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Rankin Jennifer, Kingsley Patrick (2016), “Only 177 Syrian refugees resettled in EU under deal with Turkey”, *The Guardian* online 18.05.2016 (modified 17.07.2016), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/18/europe-relocates-177-syrian-refugees-turkey-eu-deal>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Refugee crisis: Council shows solidarity with Greece by approving emergency support, (2016, 9 March) <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/09-refugee-crisis/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action, (2015, 9 Sep) <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what->

- is-new/news/news/2015/20150909\_1\_en.htm, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Report From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan - Third implementation report (2016, 4 March), [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/implementation\\_report\\_20160304\\_eu-turkey\\_joint\\_action\\_plan\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/implementation_report_20160304_eu-turkey_joint_action_plan_en.pdf), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Rinne, Ulf and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2015). "Zutritt zur Festung Europa? Anforderungen an eine moderne Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik" *Analysen Und Berichte Migration, Wirtschaftsdienst*, February 2015, Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 114-120
- Scholz, Kay-Alexander (2015). "Flüchtlinge: Kontingente Statt Chaos", <http://www.dw.com/de/fl%C3%BCchtlinge-kontingente-statt-chaos/a-18792975>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Serbos, S. and C. Baxevanis (2016). "Aligning Europe: The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Geopolitics of the Region" *International Relations*, 4(6), 390-406.
- Sirkeci, İbrahim, (2005) War in Iraq: Environment of Insecurity and International Migration, *International Migration Vol. 43* (4), 197-214
- Stabilizing the situation of refugees and migrants in Europe: Proposals to the Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey on 7 March 2016 (2016), <http://www.unhcr.org/56d94f7e9.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Suriyeli çocuklar MEB okullarında eğitim görecek (2014, 15 Nov), <http://haber.star.com.tr/egitim/suriyeli-cocuklar-meb-okullarinda-egitim-gorecek/haber-966579>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Sydow, Christoph and Philipp Wittrock (2016), Warum die MaghrebLänder jetzt als sicher gelten, <http://politik/deutschland/marokkoalgerien-tunesiensollen-sichereherkunftsstaatenwerdena1074634.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Syrian refugees in Turkey: challenges to and opportunities for longer-term integration (2016, March), <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1051-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-challenges-to-and-opportunities-for-longer-term-integration>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Şenay Özden, Syrian Refugees in Turkey, MPC Research Reports 2013/05, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013. <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPC-RR-2013-05.pdf> (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Trombetta Lorenzo (2014) The EU and the Syrian Crisis as Viewed from the Middle East, *The International Spectator*, 49:3, 27-39
- Turkey says it's tired of 'two-faced' EU attitude, 16.11.2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/turkey-says-its-tired-of-two-faced-eu-attitude/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Turkey to back out of EU migrant deal if no visa-free travel, 01.08.2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/turkey-to-back-out-of-eu-migrant-deal-if-no-visa-free-travel/>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Turkey visa deal 'unlikely' in 2017 say EU officials, 02.11.2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-visa-deal-unlikely-in-2017-say-eu-officials/a-36228260>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Turkey's progress on the visa liberalisation roadmap, 04.05.2016, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160504/turkey\\_progress\\_visa\\_liberalisation\\_roadmap\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/20160504/turkey_progress_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_en.pdf), (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Turkey's Erdogan criticises EU over Syria refugee deal, 26.07.2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36892393>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Turkey's visa liberalisation scorecard, May 2016, <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=555>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- UNHCR Global Report 2014, <http://www.unhcr.org/5575a7910.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Weseli, Barbara (2015). "Flüchtlingskrise: Der Blick geht nach Ankara", <http://www.dw.com/de/fl%C3%BCchtlingskrise-der-blick-geht-nach-ankara/a-18846752>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Winter, Chase (2016). "Turkey threatens to cancel EU migration deal", 03.11.2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-threatens-to-cancel-eu-migration-deal/a-36243636>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).
- Working with the European Union, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4dd12ad46.html>, (retrieved 19.12.2016).